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THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF JUDGING 
IN THE TAXATION CONTEXT 
NANCY STAUDT 
LEE EPSTEIN 
PETER WIEDENBECK∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the vast number of systematic empirical studies of judicial 
behavior, we know surprisingly little about how and why judges reach 
decisions in the business and finance context.1 This void is due, in part, to 
scholars’ abiding focus on controversies involving civil rights and 
liberties;2 indeed, based on the extant literature, it would be easy to 
conclude that judges, particularly U.S. Supreme Court Justices, spend their 
days interpreting civil rights–type legislation to the exclusion of all other 
types of laws. Yet this conclusion is wide of the mark—even a simple 
count of the Supreme Court’s plenary docket reveals that the Court is 
 
 
 ∗ Nancy Staudt is the Class of 1940 Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of 
Law; Lee Epstein is the Beatrice Kuhn Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science at 
Northwestern University; and Peter Wiedenbeck is the Joseph H. Zumbalen Professor of the Law of 
Property and Associate Dean of Faculty at Washington University School of Law. Please email 
thoughts or comments to Nancy Staudt at n-staudt@northwestern.edu.  
 1. We refer to the void in the quantitative empirical literature. A rich qualitative empirical 
literature exists on judicial decision making in the economic context. See, e.g., Adam Chodorow, 
Economic Analysis in Judicial Decision Making—An Assessment Based on Judge Posner’s Tax 
Decisions, 25 VA. TAX REV. 67 (2005) (describing Judge Posner’s sixty tax decisions and commenting 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying principles of law and economics); Robert M. 
Lawless & Dylan Lager Murray, An Empirical Analysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari, 62 MO. L. REV. 101, 
124−25 (1997) (exploring facts that impact certiorari in bankruptcy cases); Charles L.B. Lowndes, 
Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 222, 225 (investigating Supreme Court 
tax cases and arguing the opinions are characterized by “triviality and futility”); Beverly I. Moran & 
Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax 
Decisions, 39 HOW. L.J. 841, 856−74 (1996) (examining hundreds of Supreme Court tax cases); Nancy 
C. Staudt, Agenda Setting In Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. 
L. REV. 889 (2004) (examining Supreme Court tax cases from 1986−1994 and identifying factors that 
impact certiorari decisions); E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and 
Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571 (2004) 
(examining Supreme Court securities and antitrust decisions); Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan Silver & 
Marjorie Silver, The Behavior of Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235 (1973) 
(analyzing Supreme Court decisions addressing corporate insider trading, labor law, and tax law in an 
effort to understand Justice Douglas’s voting behavior). 
 2. For further discussion and cites highlighting findings in the civil rights literature that are not 
likely to explain decision making in economic controversies, see Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter 
Wiedenbeck, Judging Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the 
Internal Revenue Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 305 (2003).  
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more likely to address congressional statutes regulating business and the 
economy than civil rights legislation.3 
The scholarly focus on civil rights cases, of course, is not itself 
problematic. The literature on judging in this area is both deep and rich; 
the studies are numerous and the findings robust. The problem, in our 
view, is that it is far from clear whether the findings in the civil rights 
literature can be generalized to all other areas of the law and, in particular, 
to cases involving statutes regulating business or the economy (“economic 
controversies”). To be sure, researchers find similarities in the decision 
making processes across issue areas,4 but just as often they find 
differences.5  
 
 
 3. The Supreme Court has decided 2,905 cases since 1954. As depicted in the figure below, 
with the exception of a few Terms, the number of economic cases is always higher than the number of 
civil rights cases on the Supreme Court docket. In the figure, the horizontal axis depicts the Term of 
the Court and the vertical axis shows the proportion of civil rights and economic cases decided. The 
figure displays each Term between 1953 and 2002, the Terms for which we have comparative data.  
 
 4. See, e.g., Scott D. Gerber & Keeok Park, The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. 
Supreme Court: A Cross-Judicial Empirical Analysis of the Rehnquist Court Justices, 91 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 390–408 (1997) (finding Supreme Court Justices are less likely to be consensus driven on 
the Supreme Court than they were as lower court judges regardless of issue area); Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Supreme Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of Presidential Appointments, 43 W. POL. 
Q. 137 (1990) (finding Supreme Court is responsive to Solicitor General in analysis of all cases 
decided between 1953 and 1982 in which the Solicitor General filed a brief); see also HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE, 1953−2006 TERMS 
(2006), http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/allcourt_codebook.pdf (finding that Justices are 
more likely to produce outcomes that favor the federal government than any other party regardless of 
issue area).  
 5. See, e.g., Lee Esptein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 261 (1996) (finding measures of political preferences have more explanatory value in the civil 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/5
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One of the most enduring divides that scholars have uncovered 
between decision making in different areas of the law is the role of 
politics, whether in the form of partisanship or ideology. Study after study 
confirms a strong correlation between judges’ political preferences and 
their behavior in civil rights and liberties cases, but researchers have only 
rarely identified an association between politics and decisions in economic 
cases.6 Some argue that the apolitical nature of decision making in the 
business and finance contexts is due to the fact that judges simply do not 
have political preferences in these areas,7 or if they do, other factors work 
to neutralize them.8 Recently scholars have used empirical data and 
statistical methods to investigate these claims, but no study has rejected 
the null hypothesis that ideological orientation and votes are completely 
independent of each other in economic cases.  
In our view, the existing literature highlights a curious puzzle: why do 
judges appear to stand above politics in the areas of the law that are rife 
with conflict and controversy in the other two branches of government? 
Lawmaking in the context of taxation, bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, and 
corporate law, to name just a few examples, is highly political in both the 
legislative and executive branches, as many empirical scholars have 
documented.9 For this reason, we seriously question the claim that judges 
are unique in that they have no political or ideological preferences when it 
comes to business and finance. Our hypothesis is that the null findings in 
the literature are due to the technical difficulties associated with 
uncovering politics in large-n quantitative studies addressing economic 
decision making, rather than to a lack of judicial interest in these issues. 
This is the question we investigate here. 
We first briefly discuss three measures of individual preferences that 
scholars have used to assess the role of politics in the judicial decision 
making environment. Irrespective of the measure adopted, scholars reach 
the same conclusion: ideology (or partisanship) explains quite a bit about 
 
 
rights context than in the economic context); see also infra notes 17–56 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 18–56 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & “Boring” Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 
401 (2001) (Justices find economic controversies cases “boring”); see also Stuart Taylor, Reading the 
Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at B14 (“‘If one’s in the doghouse with the 
Chief, he gets the crud. He gets the tax cases and some of the Indian cases, which I like, but I’ve had a 
lot of them.’” (quoting Justice Blackmun)). 
 8. Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in 
Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 351 (2001) (finding no correlation between individual 
political preferences and judicial decision making, and noting politics may be “neutralized by the legal 
process”). 
 9. See infra notes 51−56 and accompanying text. 
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decision making in civil rights and liberties cases, but very little about 
business and finance. We then use our own data set to investigate this 
question further. Specifically, we examine every U.S. Supreme Court case 
decided between 1940 and 2005 that involves an interpretation of the 
Internal Revenue Code.10 We first approach the problem using the same 
measure of politics that researchers have adopted heretofore in the study of 
judicial decision making. We then modify this approach by using slightly 
more refined coding protocols to identify “liberal” and “conservative” 
decisions. Our study produces interesting findings, in part, because they 
are so mixed. When we aggregate the cases, we find that neither liberal 
nor conservative Justices systematically vote in favor of either the 
taxpayer or the government. When we slice the data to investigate this 
finding further, we again find a lack of association between politics and 
outcomes in individual income tax cases. When we examine only the 
corporate income tax cases, however, we obtain very different results. Our 
study suggests that liberal Justices are far more likely to vote with the 
government while conservative Justices systematically vote with corporate 
taxpayers in the Supreme Court. This finding is robust across many 
different models and suggests, at least in these circumstances, that the 
Justices do have political preferences regarding the outcomes in economic 
controversies. We think our findings have implications for empirical 
studies of judicial decision making in many areas, and we discuss these 
possibilities in the last section of the paper. 
II. THE EXTANT LITERATURE: POLITICAL PREFERENCES EXPLAIN 
OUTCOMES IN CIVIL RIGHTS BUT NOT ECONOMIC CASES 
Operationalizing the role of political preferences for purposes of 
identifying its role, if any, in judicial decision making is not a 
straightforward task. After all, scholars interested in the correlation 
between case outcomes and a judge’s partisanship or ideology cannot 
simply ask the decisionmaker to define the nature of her political 
preferences as well as the extent to which they influence her voting 
behavior. Most judges would (sincerely) respond that they are “completely 
neutral” when considering controversies in the courtroom; individual 
political preferences, it is often argued, should not—and allegedly do 
not—impact case outcomes.11  
 
 
 10. For a description of the details of our data collection procedures, see infra notes 63−64 and 
accompanying text.  
 11. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/5
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To avoid the obvious problems associated with relying on survey data 
and questionnaires, scholars have devised a wide array of approaches to 
investigate how closely correlated political preferences are to judicial 
voting behavior and, ultimately, to case outcomes. In this section, we 
focus on three of the more prominent mechanisms for quantifying the role 
of politics in the judicial context that scholars have developed over the last 
decades. The first group of scholars measures the role of politics by 
counting the number of votes a judge (or a court) casts in the liberal and 
conservative direction; as the percentage of votes reaches some threshold 
in one direction or another they are labeled either conservative or liberal. 
The second group measures the role of politics in judicial decision making 
by examining the different outcomes reached by Republican and 
Democratic presidential appointees; the former is expected to have right-
leaning proclivities while the latter is expected to be left-leaning. The third 
group relies on scores devised by expert analysts, known in the literature 
as the “Segal-Cover” ideology scores, to determine whether judges 
characterized as more liberal decide cases differently from the judges 
deemed more conservative.  
Regardless of the measure of politics used, all researchers recognize 
that identifying possible political predilections in the judging context 
requires a prior definition of both “liberal” and “conservative” decisions. 
To give meaning to the two terms, scholars look to the identity of the 
winning party as well as the claim alleged. The prevailing wisdom 
suggests that decisions supportive of “underdogs,” such as civil rights 
claimants, the criminally accused, unions, and so forth, are liberal, while 
conservative decisions include pro-business, pro-government, pro-
employer, pro-creditor, and other outcomes favoring the “haves” over the 
“have-nots.”12 Although many scholars have set forth their own standards 
for making this determination, quite a few now rely on the coding 
protocols developed by Harold Spaeth for his data collection project on 
U.S. Supreme Court decision making.13 Spaeth’s coding decisions (and all 
others that we have identified) follow the “upperdog/underdog” approach 
for characterizing a vote or an outcome as, respectively, 
conservative/liberal.  
 
 
1335, 1337 (1998) (“I maintain, and always have maintained, that appellate judging is fundamentally a 
principled practice.”). Judge Edwards also argues that empirical studies showing politics impact 
judicial decision making are seriously “mislead[ing]”. See id. 
 12. See SPAETH, supra note 4, at 52–55 (discussing coding protocols for partisan direction of 
Supreme Court cases). 
 13. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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With regard to differences in coding decisions between civil rights and 
liberties cases and the cases we have labeled “economic controversies,” 
there is an important distinction. If the case involves the federal or state 
government and the issue is in the business context, pro-government 
outcomes are coded liberal, and decisions in favor of the private party are 
labeled conservative. This approach diverges from that found in areas such 
as search and seizure or civil rights, where scholars almost uniformly view 
pro-government decisions as conservative. We explore this coding 
discrepancy further below, but for now we note that the distinction at least 
initially appears sound: we agree that an important and relevant political 
difference exists in cases involving governmental support for strict 
sanctions for accused criminals and those involving the imposition of a tax 
on corporate income or the regulation of securities markets. The former fit 
well with our understanding of conservative behavior as a victory of the 
“haves,” while the latter appear to involve the government, as 
representative of the general public, prevailing over the “haves.” In short, 
the coding protocols adhere to the conventional wisdom described above 
regarding “underdogs” and “upperdogs.” 
Following these distinctions, Spaeth and many others code tax 
decisions that are in favor of the taxpayer as conservative and decisions in 
favor of the government as liberal.14 In the securities law context, Sullivan 
and Thompson follow this approach by coding pro-government decisions 
as liberal and anti-government decisions as conservative.15 Various other 
researchers interested in business and finance cases have also followed 
suit.16 As we discuss further below, we think these coding rules work well 
in the civil rights context but produce unexpected errors in business and 
finance litigation. If methodological barriers exist to collecting and coding 
data in a reliable and accurate manner in the economic context, as we 
suspect they do, the role of politics may not surface—even if it is present. 
Before exploring this problem in further detail, we briefly describe 
empirical findings published in the existing literature. 
 
 
 14. Id.; Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial Decisions, 
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 513 (2002) [hereinafter Predicting Who Wins] (expecting federal 
judges appointed by Democratic Presidents to be systematically biased in favor of the government); 
Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins Federal Appellate 
Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer?, 25 VA. TAX REV. 201, 237 (2005) 
[hereinafter Social Background Model] (same); see also Nancy Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 612 (2004) (expecting federal judges appointed by Democratic Presidents to rule in favor of 
taxpayer standing in spending controversies). 
 15. See, e.g., Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1578−81. 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 1578−88. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss7/5
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A. Vote Counting  
The first, and for decades the dominant measure that scholars have 
used to investigate possible partisan behavior in the judging context is a 
simple tabulation of the number of votes a judge or Justice renders in the 
liberal or conservative direction, using the definitions outlined above.17 
One reason scholars have so widely adopted this approach is that it is 
relatively easy to employ. As Martin, Quinn, and Epstein note, 
All the researcher needs to do is select an area of the law—say, 
criminal procedure or an even finer one, such as Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases—and inspect the behavior of individual 
Justices in a given Term(s), Term t, with an eye toward 
characterizing [the votes] in that term or in a subsequent one, Term t 
+ 1.18  
After categorizing votes and outcomes as liberal or conservative, scholars 
then array the judges and courts in a table from most liberal to most 
conservative or along a continuum (judges with the highest percentage of 
liberal votes, for example, are placed furthest to the left and those with the 
lowest percentage on the far right) to highlight the level of partisanship 
and ideology at play in the voting process.  
One of the first scholars to adopt this approach, C. Herman Pritchett, 
examined civil rights and liberties cases decided between the 1941 and 
1946 Terms. Pritchett found (as expected) that Justices Murphy, Rutledge, 
Black, and Douglas were liberals while Justices Reed, Burton, and Vinson 
 
 
 17. Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn developed a more sophisticated measure of politics that 
also relies upon vote counting. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point 
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953−1999, 10 POL. 
ANALYSIS 134 (2002). Their findings confirm our general claim here: politics do not seem to explain 
outcomes in economic cases. We ran a logit model using the median Martin-Quinn score for each 
Term’s tax cases as the independent variable and Spaeth's direction variable as the dependent variable. 
See SPAETH, supra note 4, at 52−55 (indicating that if dir=1 court outcome is liberal, and if dir=0 
outcome is conservative). This model produced an insignificant coefficient (p=0.775) on the Martin-
Quinn score in the federal taxation context. In other words, knowing the Martin-Quinn score of the 
median Justice does not help us to predict outcomes in tax cases (at least using Spaeth's database). In 
substantive terms, the predicted probability of the most liberal court ruling in favor of the government 
(liberal according to Spaeth’s coding protocols) is 76% with a 95% confidence interval of 61%–87%; 
for the most conservative court the number is 73% with a 95% confidence interval of 61%−82%. The 
average Justice—in terms of ideology—votes for the government in 74% of the cases with a 95% 
confidence interval of 68%−80%. These are entirely trivial differences, as we would expect given that 
the coefficient is not significant. 
 18. Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States 
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1292 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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were conservatives.19 Following Pritchett, many other researchers have 
used this same technique in the civil rights context and have found results 
that place judges and Justices on a continuum that appears consistent with 
our general understanding of judicial ideology. Ulmer, for example, found 
that the Warren Court was quite a bit more liberal than many of the earlier 
Courts when it came to voting on civil liberties cases.20 LeVar counted 
votes and found that Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall consistently 
voted together for liberal outcomes in civil rights and liberties cases and 
Justices Burger and Rehnquist systematically voted for conservative 
outcomes.21 Lim similarly found that Justices Brennan and Marshall voted 
in the liberal direction on crime and civil liberties while Justices 
Rehnquist, Scalia, and White voted in the conservative direction on 
crime.22  
When it comes to judging in economic cases, however, the data are far 
less consistent and the findings less robust. Sullivan and Thompson 
calculated the votes in nearly one hundred securities cases decided over 
several Supreme Court terms and found that politics is not a strong 
predictor of outcomes.23 The authors’ coding rules characterize a liberal 
vote as one in favor of expanding the securities statutes (a pro-government 
outcome), while conservative votes are those in favor of restricting the 
coverage of the laws to narrow circumstances (an anti-government 
outcome) and thus are consistent with the coding protocols described 
above. Sullivan and Thompson find that in some eras the Justices are 
arrayed in a manner that places the well-known liberals (such as Justices 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) at one end of the spectrum and the 
conservatives predictably at the other end.24 In other eras, however, the 
Justices appear to change their views completely and the role of politics 
begins to look a bit less predictable; this randomness, the authors note, 
makes it difficult to accept the premise that the Justices’ political 
preferences offer the best explanation for their voting behavior in the 
securities law context.25 They argue that something more must be going 
 
 
 19. C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: Votes and Values, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 53, 62 
(1948). 
 20. S. Sidney Ulmer, Government Litigants, Underdogs, and Civil Liberties in the Supreme 
Court: 1903−1968 Terms, 47 J. POL. 899, 905 (1985). 
 21. C. Jeddy LeVar, The Nixon Court: A Study of Leadership, 30 W. POL. Q. 484, 487 (1977). 
 22. Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 721, 748 (2000). 
 23. See Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 1, at 1578–88. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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on, and for this reason the authors look to “entrepreneurial” activities 
undertaken by a specific Justice to explain Supreme Court activity in this 
context. They find that Justice Lewis Powell, a Justice who had extensive 
experience in securities law prior to coming to the bench, seemed to have 
the greatest impact on outcomes in this area of the law, and that after his 
retirement the outcomes become more difficult to predict and explain.26  
Various other studies appear to confirm Sullivan and Thompson’s 
finding that politics and ideology are not good predictors of decision 
making in economic contexts, notwithstanding their usefulness for 
explaining outcomes in other areas of the law. Youngsik Lim, for 
example, found a systematic correlation between politics and outcomes in 
economic controversies, but the results were not in the expected direction. 
Using the Spaeth database coding rules for identifying “liberal” and 
“conservative” decisions, he found that between the 1988 and 2000 Terms, 
Justice Rehnquist was the true liberal while Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and O’Connor were the real conservatives.27 Rather than 
confirming the role of political preferences in judicial decision making, 
these peculiar results suggest something is amiss either in our current 
theory of judging or in the existing coding processes. We hypothesize it is 
the latter. 
B.  The Party of the Appointing President  
In an attempt to move beyond vote patterns as indicators of political 
preferences, scholars have sought independent measures to quantify 
ideological or partisan viewpoints. A popular proxy for a judge’s or 
Justice’s political preference, and one that is now widely used in the legal 
literature, is the political party of the appointing President.28 A vast array 
of data suggests that U.S. Presidents hope to ensure that judicial 
appointees have preferences that mirror their own partisanship, and this 
goal leads to a nomination process rife with politics—and ultimately one 
that produces judges and Justices that reflect the views of the President. As 
Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman note,  
 
 
 26. Id. at 1592−97. 
 27. Lim, supra note 22, at 748. 
 28. Most scholars use the party of the appointing President, but others use the party of the Justice 
or a score that combines the parties of the appointing President and the Senate at the time of the 
nomination. See Martin, Quinn & Epstein, supra note 18, at 1285−86 (discussing alternative scoring 
methods). 
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A Democratic president is unlikely to want to appoint judges who 
will seek to overrule Roe v. Wade and strike down affirmative 
action programs. A Republican president is unlikely to want to 
appoint judges who will interpret the Constitution to require states 
to recognize same-sex marriages. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that as a statistical regularity, judges appointed by Republican 
presidents . . . will be more conservative than judges appointed by 
Democratic presidents . . . .29 
Numerous researchers have investigated the hypothesis that 
Republican-appointed judges reach systematically more conservative 
outcomes than those produced by Democratic appointees. Defining 
“liberal” and “conservative” outcomes in the manner described above, the 
researchers have obtained results that are consistent and robust in the civil 
rights and liberties context.30 Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman find that 
politics as measured by the party of the appointing President explains 
voting behavior in abortion cases as well as those involving capital 
punishment;31 Staudt finds a relationship in cases involving constitutional 
challenges to government spending on religious activities;32 Rowland and 
Carp uncover a strong relationship in race discrimination and religion 
cases;33 Cross and Tiller find a relationship in environmental law 
controversies;34 Gates and Cohen find Republican-appointed Justices are 
far more likely to vote against the plaintiff in racial equality cases;35 
Aliotta finds a correlation in the context of equal protection claims;36 and 
the list goes on and on.  
The correlation story, however, again changes when economic cases 
are the subject of study. Although it is true that most scholars using this 
 
 
 29. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal 
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 30. A few exceptions to the general findings exist. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on 
Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257−65 (1995) (noting these claims but arguing presidential 
politics do not explain outcomes).  
 31. Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 29, at 327−28.  
 32. Staudt, supra note 14, at 663−66. 
 33. C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS 24−26 (1996). 
 34. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175−76 (1998). 
 35. John B. Gates & Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidents, Supreme Court Justices, and Racial Equality 
Cases: 1954−1984, 10 POL. BEHAV. 22 (1988). 
 36. Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative 
Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277, 280 (1988) (“Being a 
Democrat is associated with casting votes in favor of equal protection claims.”). 
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measure of political preferences have ignored economic controversies 
altogether, those who have relied on the approach find no relationship 
between political preferences and voting behavior. Schneider, for example, 
has systematically examined taxation cases in district and appellate courts 
and finds that this measure of partisanship has no explanatory value for 
either the method of interpretation or the outcome itself.37 Even the 
Sunstein team, which finds a statistically significant correlation in nearly 
all of the civil rights and liberties contexts it examines, does not find such 
a relationship in cases outside this area, such as takings and federalism.38 
Lim’s study of Supreme Court cases decided between 1988 and 2000 also 
fails to uncover a statistically significant correlation between the party of 
the appointing President and the Justices’ decisions in economic 
controversies.39 In all these studies, judges appear apolitical when it comes 
to issues involving business and finance. 
C. The Segal-Cover Ideology Scores 
The most important advancement in terms of an exogenous 
methodology for measuring judicial ideology came in 1989 from the work 
of political scientists Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover.40 Segal and 
Cover created independent measures of ideological values for Supreme 
Court Justices using a content-analytic technique. The Segal-Cover team 
derived judicial “ideology scores” by examining statements in four of the 
nation’s leading newspapers—the New York Times, Los Angeles Times 
(now they use the Wall Street Journal), Chicago Tribune, and the 
Washington Post—from the time the President nominated a Justice to the 
Supreme Court until the confirmation vote by the U.S. Senate.41 More 
specifically, Segal and Cover coded each paragraph of the editorials 
contained in the newspapers as “liberal, moderate, conservative, or not 
applicable.”42 Liberal scores were based on several factors, including 
 
 
 37. Predicting Who Wins, supra note 14, at 513; Social Background Model, supra note 14, at 
237.  
 38. Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 29, at 326−27. This team of researchers, however, 
also found an area in the civil rights context—criminal appeals—that did not have outcomes correlated 
with the party of the appointing president. Id. at 325−26. 
 39. Lim, supra note 22, at 748. Lim, however, also failed to find a statistically significant 
association in the context of criminal law cases. Id. 
 40. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). 
 41. See id. at 559; Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron & Harold J. Spaeth, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 814 (1995). 
 42. See Segal & Cover, supra note 40, at 559 (italics in original). 
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support for the rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial 
minorities, individuals against the government in privacy and First 
Amendment cases, and the government against individuals in tax and 
takings cases. Conservative scores, by contrast, were linked to judicial 
views that went in the opposite direction. Segal and Cover then used their 
expert scoring to calculate U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ ideology ranging 
from +1 (unanimously liberal) through 0 (moderate) to –1 (unanimously 
conservative). The scores, in short, can theoretically be any real number 
between –1 and +1.43 
The Segal-Cover scores, like those discussed above, are remarkably 
reliable for predicting votes in civil rights and liberties cases. As Martin, 
Quinn, and Epstein note, the scores “are well in line with commonly held 
intuitions about particular Justices and Court eras, they appear facially 
valid,”44 and for this reason they have been used widely in studies 
investigating judicial decision making. Segal and Cover themselves use 
the scores to examine civil rights and liberties votes and find that Justices 
Marshall and Harlan are very liberal while Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
O’Connor are far to the right when it comes to casting votes.45 Similarly, 
Epstein and Mershon find the Segal-Cover scores predict civil rights, 
criminal, and civil liberties cases quite well;46 Segal, Esptein, Cameron, 
and Spaeth reach a similar conclusion.47 Many more examples support the 
point that judicial preferences as measured by the Segal-Cover scores are 
systematically correlated with votes and outcomes in civil rights and 
liberties litigation.48 
Scholars, however, have found the scores have far less explanatory 
value in economic cases generally, and virtually no explanatory value in 
specific areas of the law, such as taxation. Epstein and Mershon conducted 
a methodological audit of the usefulness of the Segal-Cover scores across 
issue areas, and their work highlights the problem.49 The scores appear to 
explain forty-three percent of votes in civil rights cases, eighteen percent 
of the votes in economic cases generally, and zero percent of the Justices’ 
 
 
 43. Id. at 559. 
 44. Martin, Quinn & Epstein, supra note 18, at 1290. 
 45. Segal & Cover, supra note 40. 
 46. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 5, at 264–71. 
 47. Segal, Epstein, Cameron & Spaeth, supra note 41, at 815−20. 
 48. E.g., Francine Sanders Romero, The Supreme Court and the Protection of Minority Rights: 
An Empirical Examination of Racial Discrimination Cases, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 291, 306−07 (2000). 
 49. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 5, at 277−78 & tbl.4. 
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decisions in taxation cases.50 To make the point even more transparent, we 
created a figure to depict the linear relationship between politics and 
judging in two different issue areas. Figure 1 below compares the 
relationship between the Justices’ ideology and their voting in civil 
liberties (Panel A) and tax cases (Panel B). The horizontal axis in both 
panels of Figure 1 displays the Justices’ ideology, as derived from the 
Segal-Cover scores. The vertical axis shows the percentage of support for 
the party alleging a rights violation or the government in tax cases. Note 
that the relationship between ideology and voting is rather strong in the 
rights cases (r = +.677) but not in tax litigation (r = +.145).51  
 
 
 50. Id.  
 51. The Segal-Cover scores are available in LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFERY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND 
CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 110 (2005). Data on voting is derived from 
Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, with dec_type=1 or 7 and analu=0 and value 
set to 1-6 for civil liberties and 12 for tax cases. SPAETH, supra note 4. The authors include only 
justices participating in ten or more cases; Justice Jackson was excluded for that reason.  
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FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY AND VOTES 
IN CIVIL LIBERTIES CASES (PANEL A) AND TAX CASES (PANEL B). 
PANEL A: PROPORTION OF LIBERAL VOTES (I.E., THOSE FOR 
“UNDERDOGS”) IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES  
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PANEL B: PROPORTION OF LIBERAL VOTES  
(I.E., THOSE FOR GOVERNMENT) IN TAX CASES 
 
Figure 1 and the studies described above highlight the question that 
interests us: why do politics, defined either in terms of ideology or 
partisanship, help account for decisions in the areas of civil rights and civil 
liberties but not in the economic context? We find it extremely unlikely 
that judges and Justices simply set aside their political preferences in cases 
involving business and finance questions, or that the preferences are so 
weak they cannot show up in empirical studies. Many congressional 
scholars, such as Poole and Rosenthal; Cox and McCubbins; Smith and 
Deering; Suarez; and Fenno, to name just a few, find that the most 
powerful—and political—legislators are those involved in economic 
lawmaking.52 Scholars find, for example, that the legislators serving on the 
 
 
 52. See, e.g., GARY COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (1993); KEITH KREHBEIL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION 49−52 (1991); KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); RICHARD SPOHN & CHARLES MCCOLLUM, THE 
REVENUE COMMITTEES (1975); SANDRA L. SUAREZ, DOES BUSINESS LEARN? TAX BREAKS, 
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Appropriations, Ways and Means, Finance, Commerce, and Banking 
Committees wield the most political power in Congress.53 These studies 
demonstrate that the committees and their members routinely craft highly 
partisan legislation and consistently vote along party lines during roll call 
votes.54 In fact, these studies show that legislators with control over 
economic issues are just as partisan as those with control over civil rights 
and liberties issues, if not more so.55 Empirical studies of the presidency 
produce similar findings: political maneuvering and partisan politics 
pervade executive activities on a day-to-day basis in the business and 
finance context.56  
III. DEFINING IDEOLOGY IN THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT: ARE THE 0’S ALL 
0’S AND THE 1’S ALL 1’S?  
Given the importance of budget issues, tax policy, securities regulation, 
and so forth for the political careers of legislators and Presidents, it seems 
implausible that judges simply do not care—or know little about—the 
economic issues that find their way into the courtroom. For this reason, we 
hypothesize that the null findings in the extant literature may be a by-
product of the way in which scholars have operationalized the term 
“ideology” in business and finance cases. In particular, we believe the 
existing coding protocols that researchers use (and that we too have relied 
on in our work) to categorize liberal and conservative decisions may be 
problematic when transposed into the economic context. As noted above, 
scholars routinely characterize liberal decisions as those that go in favor of 
the “underdog,” such as civil rights complainants, the criminally accused, 
unions, and so forth; conservative decisions are understood as those that 
 
 
UNCERTAINTY, AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES (2000); see also E. SCOTT ADLER, WHY CONGRESSIONAL 
REFORMS FAIL: REELECTION AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE SYSTEM, 149 tbl.10 (2002) (tax-writing 
committees subject to capture); RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 1−45 (1973) 
(same); JOHN F. MANLEY, THE POLITICS OF FINANCE: THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 
(1970) (same); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 140−54 (1973) (same); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A 
Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
86−87 (1990) (stating that tax law has been dominated “by interested groups that seek favors for 
themselves and that through a norm of logrolling, almost never oppose favors for each other”); accord 
JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1985) (exploring 
history of politics in tax context). 
 53. See generally STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (3d 
ed. 1997). 
 54. See generally COX & MCCUBBINS, supra note 52. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally THOMAS J. REESE, THE POLITICS OF TAXATION (1980).  
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favor businesses, employers, creditors, and the government. With respect 
to cases involving economic issues, the coding protocols are precisely the 
same unless the government is involved in the litigation. In cases that 
involve the government as a participant and concern issues such as 
securities regulation, taxation, antitrust, and corporate law, an outcome in 
favor of the government is coded as liberal, and an outcome in favor of the 
private party is coded as conservative. When quantified, the former is 
coded as 0 and the latter as 1. This approach to identifying liberal and 
conservative decisions is certainly a plausible first approximation, but 
there are many cases in which it would produce questionable 
characterizations of the data, and in some cases the rule would lead 
researchers to make demonstrably false categorizations. To make our point 
more clear, we focus on taxation litigation.  
The coding rules mandate that all private parties, be they poor 
individuals, partnerships, public corporations, or nonprofits, be viewed 
identically; this means that a decision in favor of any of these parties is a 
conservative decision. Although a court decision that enhances the 
government’s ability to tax corporations and “big businesses” seems 
consistent with a liberal point of view, when the taxpayer is a poor 
individual the decision might more accurately be labeled a conservative 
decision. For example, when the government prevails in a lawsuit 
contesting a poor taxpayer’s right to the Earned Income Tax Credit, we 
think it is an error to categorize the outcome as liberal. Consider the case 
of United States v. Dalm,57 which involved an individual taxpayer, Francis 
Dalm, who mistakenly paid too much tax on money she received from her 
employer for serving as a “loyal secretary” for decades.58 Although the 
statute of limitations had run out by the time Dalm went to court to obtain 
a refund, the Sixth Circuit determined she was nevertheless entitled to 
recompense under the doctrine of equitable recoupment.59 The Supreme 
Court reversed this decision, holding Dalm was not entitled to recovery of 
the taxes she paid but did not actually owe.60 In their dissent, Justices 
Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall argued that the Court’s outcome was not 
required by the law and that the majority had effectively sanctioned 
government conduct that was both “‘immoral’ and tantamount to a ‘fraud 
on the taxpayer’s rights.’”61 The existing coding rules would require a 
 
 
 57. 494 U.S. 596 (1990). 
 58. Id. at 598. 
 59. Id. at 600. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 612 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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scholar to code Dalm as a liberal outcome, and yet the three dissenting 
Justices seemed to think that forcing a working-class woman to pay taxes 
twice on the same income was anything but liberal. There are many other 
cases in our database of Supreme Court tax decisions that also raise this 
problem. 
Put differently, the conventional approach to coding could lead to 
systematic errors in the identification of liberal and conservative decisions 
in the economic context. We think this problem is especially likely to 
occur in the economic context because the federal government litigates 
against such diverse parties when the issues involve business and finance. 
Taxpayer litigants are extremely diverse along socioeconomic lines, and 
the same may be said of the parties involved in securities litigation, 
bankruptcy, and business law generally. In the civil rights and liberties 
cases, we also expect some diversity among claimants (for example, white 
individuals alleging “reverse discrimination”), and not all will receive the 
same level of sympathy from liberal Justices. But we expect to find—on a 
routine basis—a mixture of different types of parties in the business 
context and relatively homogenous claimants in civil rights and liberties 
litigation. If our hypothesis is an accurate description of the data, then this 
would explain why politics is highly correlated with decision making in so 
many legal areas, but not in the context of business and finance. To be 
clear, we do not object to the methodology that characterizes decisions in 
favor of the “upperdog” as conservative and those in favor of the 
“underdog” as liberal; rather our reservation lies with the coarse coding 
rules researchers use to identify these two parties. We are confident that 
the government should not always be viewed as the “underdog” in taxation 
cases and, similarly, that the taxpayer should not uniformly be considered 
the “upperdog,” but conventional rules require coders to conclude as 
much. 
Of course, we recognize that the all-purpose rules are useful precisely 
because they do not require researchers to examine each individual case to 
identify the liberal or conservative nature of the outcome. This more 
refined approach would obviously lead to a database that, while perhaps 
more accurate, would have very little scientific use. It would be next to 
impossible to replicate, reproduce, update, or build on the individual 
researcher’s work, essential components of valid empirical research.62 
Although we hope eventually to develop coding rules that avoid both the 
 
 
 62. See generally Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
SOCIAL MEASUREMENT (2005), first proof available at http://Epstein.law.northwestern.edu/ 
research/codingvariables.pdf. 
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drawbacks of the existing approach as well as the problems associated 
with individual analysis of each case, for purposes of this essay we test our 
theory in a different manner. We use Supreme Court tax cases in a way 
that steers clear of coding errors: we look to the data in the aggregate, then 
examine individual taxpayer cases and corporate taxpayer cases 
separately. Disaggregation allows us to identify the role of politics without 
veering from existing coding rules. We hypothesize that, although the 
Justices may have diverse views on taxpayers generally, their views on 
corporate taxpayers are likely to be more uniform: liberal Justices will 
favor the government in controversies involving corporations, but 
conservative Justices will be more apt to favor the corporation. We do not 
expect the Justices to have similarly consistent views in cases involving 
the other groups of taxpayers, for the reasons we just noted. We explore 
this hypothesis and discuss our empirical findings below.  
IV. THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN ECONOMIC CASES: A CASE STUDY IN 
TAXATION 
To test our theory that politics informs and impacts judges’ decision 
making in economic controversies and that the existing literature has 
missed this correlation due to definitional problems, we investigate U.S. 
Supreme Court tax cases. In this section, we first outline our data 
collection procedures, our coding protocols, and our findings. We then 
comment on the implications of our study for future research. 
A. Data Collection and Coding Decisions 
For purposes of this essay, we collected every Supreme Court tax case 
decided between 1941 and 2004 (i.e., the 1940−2003 Terms). We began 
our data collection by first identifying every case in the Supreme Court 
that mentioned the word “tax” or a variant thereof.63 We then reviewed 
each case produced by the search, retaining only those cases that involved 
an interpretation of a federal tax statute. This procedure led us to exclude 
state taxation cases, as well as cases involving tax fraud, jurisdictional 
 
 
 63. We identified these cases via a LEXIS search. The LEXIS search that we conducted reads as 
follows: (federal w/s tax!) or (excise w/s tax!) or (estate w/s tax!) or (user w/5 fee) or (user w/s tax!) or 
(tax! w/s fraud) or (irc) or (i.r.c.) or (stamp w/s tax!) or (income w/s tax!) or (internal w/s revenue) or 
(tax! w/s lien) or (tax! w/s code) or (tax! w/s evad!) or (tax! w/s evasion) or (corporate w/s tax!) or 
(payroll w/s tax!) or (employment w/s tax!) or (social w/s security) or (26 usc) or (26 u.s.c.) or (tax! 
w/s refund) or (tax! w/s deficiency) or (unemployment w/s tax!) or (gift w/s tax!) or (fica w/s tax!) or 
(f.i.c.a. w/s tax!). 
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questions, and evidentiary issues (if they did not involve a statutory 
interpretation issue). At the end of the culling process, we obtained a data 
set of 487 distinct cases,64 dispersed over sixty-four Supreme Court 
Terms. 
The Court decided thirty-three percent of these tax cases in the 1940s, 
and the remaining sixty-six percent in the next five decades. The corporate 
income tax was litigated in thirty-five percent of the cases; the individual 
income tax in eighteen percent of the cases; procedural issues, such as 
statute of limitation issues, in seventeen percent of the cases; criminal 
issues in ten percent; and the remaining cases involved a variety of issues 
such as estate and gift taxes, pass-through entities, excise taxes, social 
security taxes, and nonprofits. In each era and in each context, the federal 
government was far more likely to win. The government won roughly 
seventy percent of the cases overall; the sovereign win rate was highest in 
the 1950s, when the government won seventy-five percent of its cases, and 
is currently at its nadir, with only fifty-five percent of the cases decided in 
favor of the government. We comment further upon and offer a 
preliminary explanation of these statistics below. 
For purposes of investigating the role of politics in this essay, we 
adopted the social scientists’ and legal scholars’ “rule of thumb” with 
regard to coding outcomes: a liberal outcome (coded 0) is in favor of the 
government and a conservative outcome (coded 1) goes in favor of the 
taxpayer. However, we examined only the individual income tax cases and 
the corporate tax cases. Thus, we excluded criminal cases, estate and gift 
tax cases, procedural issues, and so forth. We made this decision in order 
to test our hypothesis that individual taxpayer controversies will involve 
taxpayers from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds and will not 
easily or uniformly conform to the label “upperdog,” and thus the 
outcomes in these cases will not be systematically correlated to judicial 
ideology. The corporate taxpayers, by contrast, more readily fit within the 
existing coding rules, and thus this is the most likely place to find judicial 
politics in economic decision making.  
To measure the Justices’ political preferences, we adopted the Segal-
Cover scores. Although this approach to quantifying the Justices’ politics 
has its drawbacks, we think it the best of the three measures readily 
available for our purposes.65 In future investigations of the ideological 
 
 
 64. The unit of analysis used to compute this figure is the case citation and not the docket 
number. If we use the docket number, the figure increases to 554. We included only orally argued 
cases that resulted in a per curiam judgment or an opinion of the Court. 
 65. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the Segal-Cover scores, see Martin, 
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component of judging in the taxation context, we plan to use the other 
measures outlined above to test the robustness of our findings here.  
Our empirical test of the role that politics plays in Supreme Court 
decision making in the tax context involves three simple logit models. In 
each model, the dependent variable is the prevailing party (government=0 
and taxpayer=1) and the independent variable is the Segal-Cover score for 
the median Justice sitting on the Court. The first model includes the 260 
cases involving both individual and corporate income tax controversies; 
the second model includes only the eighty-nine individual cases; and the 
third model includes only the 171 corporate tax cases. As predicted, 
judicial ideology explains decision making neither in the aggregated 
model (both individual and corporate) nor in the model restricted to the 
eighty-nine individual cases. The Justices’ political preferences, however, 
have significant explanatory value in the model that includes solely the 
corporate cases—the correlation is statistically significant at the .033 level 
and in the expected direction.66 
We think these findings are important because they highlight the 
possible definitional problems with the existing studies on decision 
making in the business and finance context. Our first model, the 
aggregated model, takes the approach that most researchers adopt for 
investigating the role of politics: all the cases are grouped together and 
pro-government decisions are coded as liberal and anti-government 
decisions are coded as conservative. Our findings mirror those found in 
the extant literature: there is no relationship between judicial politics and 
outcomes. In the second and third models we slice the data in order to 
examine corporate and individual cases separately, and we find a strong 
correlation only in the corporate context. Liberal Justices are significantly 
more likely to produce pro-government outcomes when the case involves 
 
 
Quinn & Epstein, supra note 18, at 1290−92. 
 66. The results of the three logit models investigating the role of politics in Supreme Court tax 
cases are depicted in the Table below. The dependent variable is coded 1 if the taxpayer prevails and 0 
if the government prevails. Maximum likelihood logit coefficients are presented with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the .05 level is denoted by a double asterisk (**). 
 Model 1 
(Aggregated Data) 
N=260 
Model 2 
(Individual Taxpayers) 
N=89 
Model 3 
(Corporate Taxpayers) 
N=171 
Median Justice 
 
Constant 
 
Pseudo R2 
.364 (.300) 
 
.596 (.158) 
 
.004 
-.498 (.568) 
 
.979 (.295) 
 
.007 
.783 (.368)** 
 
.401 (.193) 
 
.02 
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a corporation—an outcome we think fits with most scholars’ intuition of 
what constitutes “liberal decision making.”  
In order to quantify the substantive impact of our findings in the 
corporate context, we calculated the change in the Court’s predicted 
probability of producing a pro-government outcome as the median Justice 
becomes more liberal. To generate the predicted probabilities, we used the 
software program Clarify,67 first estimating a logit model with the winner, 
the government or the corporation, as the dependent variable and using as 
the independent variables the Segal-Cover scores and the codification date 
of the current Tax Code (pre-1954=0; post-1954=1).68 Second, we set the 
Codification of the Tax Code variable at 1 (the results do not change 
appreciably if codification is set at 0). In Figure 2 below, we depict these 
probabilities and show that an extremely conservative Court is more likely 
to rule for the corporation than for the government. The y-axis displays the 
predicted probability of the government winning in corporate income tax 
cases; the x-axis plots the ideology of the median Justice on the Supreme 
Court using the Segal-Cover scores. The solid line in the graph depicts the 
actual probabilities and the light gray horizontal lines in the graph depict 
the ninety-five percent confidence intervals. 
 
 
 67. Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and 
Presenting Statistical Results, 8 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1 (2003). The Clarify software is available at 
http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify. 
 68. Between 1913 and 1954, Congress revised the Tax Code twenty-three times. The structure of 
the Code, however, has remained largely intact since 1954. See Nancy Staudt, Rene Lindstaedt & 
Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation (forthcoming) (manuscript at 17 n.18, on file with 
author). 
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FIGURE 2: THE PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A PRO-GOVERNMENT 
DECISION IN CORPORATE INCOME TAX CASES BY THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE MEDIAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICE. 
 
As the figure shows, the likelihood of a pro-government decision 
increases significantly as the Court becomes more liberal. When the Court 
is extremely liberal, the probability that the government prevails is eighty-
three percent; whereas when the Court is at its most conservative, the 
probability that the government will prevail falls to forty-seven percent. A 
moderate court (i.e. a Court with the median coded as 0) will produce a 
government win roughly sixty-three percent of the time, which is the mean 
percentage of government wins in our database of all income tax cases. 
These statistics offer an explanation for why the government won more 
often in the 1950s and is currently losing corporate tax cases at a high rate: 
in the 1950s the Court had a Segal-Cover score of +.499, while the current 
Court has had a score of –.349 since the 2000 Term. Although we do not 
have cases from the 2005 Term in our data set, given the Court’s current 
score of –.5, our models predict that a corporation has a fifty-four percent 
probability of winning a case—quite a bit higher than the mean rate, which 
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is just thirty-seven percent over the course of the sixty-four Supreme Court 
Terms we examined. 
We tested the robustness of our finding by adding additional 
independent variables to each of the models and obtained similar findings. 
We controlled for cases decided pre- and post-1954 (the date when 
Congress substantially revised and recodified the Internal Revenue Code), 
the direction of the lower court holding (i.e., pro- or anti-government), and 
the state of the economy. We specified the models with each of the 
additional variables separately and in aggregate and found that politics as 
measured by the Segal-Cover scores continued to be statistically 
significant in the model that includes only corporate tax cases. Politics was 
not correlated with outcome in either the aggregated model or the model 
evaluating the individual taxpayer cases.  
Although we can only speculate why the Justices do not appear to be 
politically motivated in individual taxpayer cases, we expect it relates to 
the diverse characteristics of this group and thus the categorization 
problems described earlier. In Dalm, the liberal Justices viewed Francis 
Dalm as a sympathetic taxpayer entitled to a refund, but many individuals 
that come to the Court are likely to be wealthy taxpayers challenging taxes 
such as those imposed on business activities, capital gains, and so forth—
challenges that would most likely not get a sympathetic ear from the 
liberal Justices.69 We expect that grouping all individual taxpayers 
together and then labeling pro-taxpayer outcomes as “conservative” has 
disadvantages for empiricists interested in correlations between politics 
and outcomes. In some cases, the decisions are accurately categorized as 
conservative, but others should be coded as liberal. This grouping 
problem, however, is greatly attenuated in the corporate context because 
liberals systematically oppose pro-corporate outcomes and conservatives 
prefer them, just as expected. 
B. Implications for Future Research 
Our simple models suggest we should reject the null hypothesis that 
politics plays no role in judicial decision making that involves business 
and finance. Although our findings are preliminary and we acknowledge 
 
 
 69. In United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983), for example, a group of individual royalty 
owners filed suit challenging the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980. A unanimous Court found in 
favor of the government, noting that the law did not violate the uniformity clause. Id. at 83–85. Unlike 
Dalm discussed in the text, in Ptasynski the pro-government decision fits with our understanding of a 
“liberal” decision. 
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that we have quite a bit more work to do before fully accepting our results, 
we think they highlight a problem worthy of further investigation. 
Scholars interested in uncovering the role that politics plays in the judicial 
decision making process—whether in the form of partisanship or 
ideology—may have adopted flawed mechanisms for identifying this 
relationship. With more nuanced coding protocols—rules that account for 
the systematic diversity of parties in court—researchers may be able to test 
their theory of politics with far more precision. Indeed, we expect that a 
more refined approach to quantifying data may lead to a better 
understanding of decision making not only in the economic context but 
also in the civil rights and liberties context. Attention to the problem of 
using overly generalized rules in the data collection process will avoid the 
problem of grouping dissimilar observations together as if they are similar, 
and this could well lead to a stronger association between judges’ personal 
preferences and their voting behavior in the areas in which scholars have 
already identified a strong relationship. 
Our next step, then, involves the design and formulation of coding 
rules that will allow students of judicial decision making to gain a better 
understanding of the ways in which politics informs voting, and ultimately 
outcomes, in different areas of the law. With more refined data, we hope to 
be able to shed light on the ways in which judicial ideology is at work in 
the courtroom and identify circumstances where we can say with 
confidence that it is absent.  
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